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AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES: RECOVERING
THE COST OF COMPLIANCE
By DENNIS WILSON*
N EARLY AS SOON AS man began to conceive of devices
that could bear him aloft, he also began to perceive their
potential defects. The story of the flight of Icarus is a good
example. Icarus, using wings made of feathers and wax, flew
too close to the sun. The hot sun melted the wax holding the
wings together and Icarus crashed into the sea.1 Had Icarus
suffered a similar fate in the late 20th Century in the United
States, the crash undoubtedly would have caused an investi-
gation into the "airworthiness" of human propelled wings
made of wax and feathers. Aircraft design is extensively regu-
lated in the United States. The authority for this regulation
is founded on title VI, section 601 of the Federal Aviation Act
of 19582 (Act). This section empowers the Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to set minimum
standards for virtually every component of an aircraft. To
implement the Administrator's authority, title VI, section 603
of the Act sets up a certification system by which the FAA
approves and issues type certificates, production certificates
and airworthiness certificates for aircraft and aircraft
components.4
* Bachelor of Arts with Highest Honors, 1975; J.D. with High Honors, 1979, Uni-
versity of Iowa. Mr. Wilson is currently associated with the law firm of Grant,
McHendrie, Haines and Crouse in Denver, Colorado.
- BULLFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY, THE AGE OF FABLE 170-71 (1948).
2 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1976). The Act is codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1523 (1976).
49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1)-(4) (1976).
49 U.S.C. § 1423 (1976). For a general discussion of the certification process
through which the FAA acts, see Howe, Atorthtness: The Government's Role, 17 FORUM
645, 645-55 (1982).
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As part of its effort to provide for safe aircraft, the FAA
also promulgates regulations known as "Airworthiness Direc-
tives" 5 (AD). Airworthiness Directives typically require that
aircraft be inspected or modified for safety reasons. Part 39
of title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations states the crite-
ria for the issuance of an AD. It provides:
This part prescribes airworthiness directives that apply to air-
craft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances (hereinafter
referred to in this part as "Products") when
(a) An unsafe conditon exists in a product; and
(b) That condition is likely to exist or develop in other prod-
ucts of the same type design.6
Part 39 further provides that "[n]o person may operate a
product to which an airworthiness directive applies except in
accordance with the requirements of that airworthiness direc-
tive."7 Though these sections are quite brief, they can never-
theless have an enormous economic impact on an, aircraft
operator. An AD, for example, grounded all DC-10 aircraft
until performance of a required inspection of the pylons at-
taching the engines to the wings of each aircraft.8 Even for
an aircraft owner who does not fly commercially, the cost of
compliance with an AD can be substantial.9 Also, compli-
ance with an AD is mandaloiy; the owner of the aircraft has no
choice as to whether to comply (though the time of compli-
ance can sometimes be varied and an owner may be given
, 14 C.F.R. §§ 39.1, 39.13 (1982). See generaly Carsey, Initial and Contznuing Responsi-
buhes of GeneralAviation Manufacturers, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 295, 298 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Carsey]; Fleming,The Duty of the Manufacturer to Recall Aircrafl, 45 J. AIR L. &
COM. 581, 581-83 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Fleming].
1; 14 C.F.R. § 39.1 (1982).
7 Id. § 39.3.
" 44 Fed. Reg. 37,617 (1979) (to be codifed at 14 C.F.R. § 39.13). This AD followed
the disastrous crash of a DC-10 at Chicago's O'Hare Airport on May 25, 1979.
Statistics compiled by the Staff of Aviation Consumer magazine for ADs issued
during 1980 affecting general aviation aircraft revealed that the average expenditure
to comply with an AD was $218.22 in the case of Piper aircraft owners, $30.21 in the
case of Cessna owners, $231.40 for Beechcraft owners, and $86.25 for Mooney owners.
Who Pays ForADs?, AVIATION CONSUMER, March 1, 1981, at 5-8 [hereinafter cited as.
Who Paysfor AAs?]. These figures are, of course, averages; a particular AD may be very
expensive to comply with.
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several alternative methods of compliance)."0
Because ADs are mandatory, and because they are fre-
quently quite expensive-both in out-of-pocket costs and air-
craft downtime-it is not surprising that ADs have been the
subject of a considerable amount of friction between aircraft
owners and manufacturers. Aircraft owners complain that
even though ADs are usually a result of the manufacturer's
errors, owners frequently must bear the cost.11 Manufactur-
ers, on the other hand, point out that the costs of AD compli-
ance must ultimately be passed on to the consumer regardless
of who pays the initial bill. Moreover, the manufacturers
claim that they are already picking up a good deal of the cost
of ADs. This claim is disputed by owners.' 2 Not surprisingly,
Congress and at least one state legislature have become con-
cerned with the situation and have considered legislation
dealing with the apportionment of the cost of AD compliance
between owners and manufacturers. 3
The purpose of this article is to review the current state of
the law concerning liability for the cost of AD compliance
14 C.F.R. § 39.3 (1982) See also Carsey, supra note 5. The amount of input that
an aircraft owner has in the promulgation of an AD varies. Non-emergency ADs must
go through the full panoply of procedures required by the Administrative Procedure
Act. Urgent ADs can be adopted less than 30 days after publication in the Federal
Register. Emergency ADs can be adopted immediately to correct problems felt to be
immediate and serious dangers. Fleming, supra note 5. The mandatory nature of an
AD makes it different from service bulletins or service letters, which are sent by aircraft
manufacturers or component manufacturers and suggest changes or warn of potentially
dangerous conditions. They may or may not be safety related. Seegenerally L. KREIN-
DLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 7.02 (1981); Fleming, supra note 5, at 583.
Who Pays For ADs?, supra note 9, at 10-11.
z Id at 5-11.
'In August of 1980, Representative John F. Seiberling (D-Ohio) introduced the
Defective Aircraft Remedy Act, which saw little action in the Congress. This bill
would have required aircraft manufacturers to pay all but labor costs for ADs issued
because of design or manufacturing defects in the aircraft. In 1979, Illinois State Sena-
tor John A. Davidson introduced a bill in the Illinois legislature. This bill was similar
to the congressional bill, but put a five-year time limit on the manufacturer's liability.
It passed the legislature but was vetoed by Illinois Governor James Thompson. Even
though the legislature seemed prepared to override the Governor's veto, Senator Da-
vidson withdrew the bill upon assurances by the General Aviation Manufacturer's As-
sociation (GAMA) that the cost of ADs was already being borne substantially by
aircraft manufacturers. Lacagnina, Hidden Costs, 24 AOPA PILOT 89, 89-90 (1981).
The data put forth by GAMA in support of its claim has, however, been questioned.
See Who Pays For ADs?, supra note 9, at 6-7.
4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
and to review the various remedies available to an aircraft
owner who feels that he has been unfairly required to pay for
an AD that is the fault of the manufacturer. Four theories of
recovery will be examined: (1) breach of warranty; (2) negli-
gence; (3) strict products liability; and (4) private cause of
action under the Act. The article will then suggest a system
by which aircraft owners and manufacturers can cooperate to
fairly apportion the cost of AD compliance.
I. LIABILITY FOR. THE COST OF AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVE COMPLIANCE
Neither the Act nor any of the regulations pursuant to it
promulgated by the FAA specify how the cost of AD compli-
ance is to be apportioned between the owner and the manu-
facturer. 4 Instead, the aircraft owner is left to whatever
remedies he may have under contract and tort law. This sec-
tion will review the various theories under which recovery has
been attempted and their treatment by the courts.
A. Warrantizes
The most obvious course of action for an owner whose air-
craft has become the subject of an AD is to make a claim
under the aircraft manufacturer's warranty. If the aircraft or
its components are still covered by a warranty, the party giv-
ing the warranty will probably be obligated to fix the condi-
tion leading to the AD. 5 The first step in asserting a claim
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1523 (1976); 14 C.F.R. § 39.1
(1982). See also Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 1976),
discussed infra at notes 76-77, 94-99, 156-190 and accompanying text; Heckel v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 467 F. Supp. 278, 281 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
,r, U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-714(2). See, e.g., Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403
P.2d 145, 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Teledyne Indus. v. Patron Aviation Inc., 161
Ga. App. 596, 288 S.E. 2d 911, 913 (1982) (holding aircraft engine manufacturer liable
for the cost of repair of a defective engine covered by an express warranty); Spence v.
Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873, 876
(1958) (stating that defects in cinder blocks constituted a breach of an implied war-
ranty); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 310-11 (1965)
(holding that purchaser of defective carpet could recover damages from manufacturer
under a theory of implied warranty of reasonable fitness even though loss was only
economic).
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under a written manufacturer's or seller's warranty is to read
the provisions of the warranty and compare them with the
defect or problem an AD seeks to remedy. Such a reading will
usually disclose an immediate problem: aircraft and aircraft
component manufacturers' warranty periods are surprisingly
brief. Such warranties usually last only between three and six
months.16 Engine warranties are similarly brief. 7 Moreover,
most airframe manufacturers pay only a flat rate for labor,
regardless of what the particular shop that is doing the labor
actually charges. The aircraft owner must make up the
difference. 18
Another problem with warranties is the limitations of their
coverage. Warranties often contain disclaimers, exclusions of
coverage or clauses that limit liability to the repair or replace-
ment of defective parts.19 These disclaimers and limitations
are often upheld by the courts, especially where only eco-
nomic loss and not personal injury results from a defect."0 An
Log Book, AVIATION CONSUMER, Oct. 1, 1981 at 21. Beechcraft's basic warranty
lasts only 180 days (though specific components and accessories receive extended cover-
age). Cessna's warranty lasts just six months for single-engined aircraft and twelve
months for twin-engined aircraft. Mooney's warranty lasts six months and Piper's war-
ranty lasts 180 days. Id.
,7 Id Teledyne Continental's basic warranty lasts only six months or 240 hours of
use, whichever occurs first; Avco Lycoming's warranty lasts six months with no engine
time use limit. Id
"' Id
Magdelinat, Negotitting an Aircraft Purchase Contract, 5 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L.
155, 164 (1980).
11 See, e.g., Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267, 269 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding valid a disclaimer clause in an aircraft purchase agreement where de-
fective part caused aircraft to explode but caused no personal injury); Steiner Aero AB
v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 712 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that purchasers of
rebuilt aircraft engine could not recover for property damage sustained when engine
failed on takeoff where sales contract had expressly excluded all warranties after a six
month or one hundred hour period); Delta Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503
F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) (holding that plaintiffs
were not entitled to recover the cost of repair of aircraft nosegear that collapsed where
exculpatory clause limited liability to contractual warranty provisions); Delta Air
Lines v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 (1965)
(holding that the law does not, in general, prohibit a clear and express contract absolv-
ing an actor from his own negligence); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United
Aircraft Corp., 53 Del. 7, 163 A.2d 582, 585 (1960) (holding that plaintiffs could not
recover for damage caused by aircraft propellers where contractual provisions had lim-
ited warranty to replacement and repair of the propellers alone).
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additional problem confronting a potential claimant under a
warranty is whether the warranty applies to him at all.
Courts have reached different conclusions on the question of
whether a second or third-hand purchaser of goods may
claim under a warranty given by the manufacturer or seller
to an earlier purchaser. Certain courts have held that a re-
mote purchaser may not maintain an action based on war-
ranty against a manufacturer on the grounds that a warranty
claim requires contractual privity.21 Other courts, analogiz-
ing to products liability law, have permitted recovery against
manufacturers for defective goods by remote purchasers
solely for economic loss. 2 2 If a manufacturer makes an ex-
press warranty, but fails to limit it to the original purchaser, a
second or third purchaser faced with AD compliance may be
able to recover, depending on the jurisdiction. 3
Warranties may also contain language traps. In the case of
Banko v. Continental Motors Corp. ,24 for example, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that an air-
craft engine manufacturer's advertising statements claiming
that an engine was free from "carburetor ice" constituted an
express warranty.2 5 The aircraft crashed as a result of icing
"I Tanner v. Rebel Aviation, Inc., 146 Ga. App. 110, 245 S.E.2d 463, 465 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1979); Murray v. Bensen Aircraft Corp., 1964 U.S. Av. R. 815 (N.C. 1963); Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., I Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 290
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
2 Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P. 2d 145, 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20
(1965); (holding that where there was an express warranty to purchaser in the purchase
order, no privity of contract was required to render truck manufacturer liable for
breach); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90
N.W.2d 873, 878-79 (1958) (stating that "the modern trend is to permit recovery by
remote vendees against the manufacturer whether the action sounds in negligence or
implied warranty or both"); see generaly Comment, Manufacturers'Labih'ty to Remote Aur-
chasers for "Economic Loss" Damages - Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 540-41
(1966).
23 Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399,
402-04, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply,
Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873, 879-81 (1958). In one interesting case, Omni
Flying Club Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 366 Mass. 154, 315 N.E.2d 855 (1974), the
court held that absence of privity might permit recovery, since the manufacturer's dis-
claimer did not apply to the remote purchaser, thereby permitting an action for negli-
gence. Id at 888-89.
24 251 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Va.), afd, 373 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1966).
2., Id at 233.
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in the engine. When the owner sued, however, the court de-
nied recovery after expert testimony was unable to establish
where the ice formed and how it got into the throttle area.26
The court held that the express warranty that carburetor ice
would not form was not a warranty that ice would not form
elsewhere in the engine and then migrate to the carburetor
area to cause engine failure.27
While the result in Banko was unfavorable to the plaintiffs,
it does suggest a course of action for a distressed aircraft own-
er seeking to recover for breach of warranty. An express war-
ranty does not have to be contained in a document headed by
the word "Warranty. ' 28 An express warranty can be created
by statements of the seller relating to or describing the
goods.29 If an aircraft purchaser remembers what the seller
said before or at the time of the purchase, it is possible that
some of those statements could be construed as express war-
ranties upon which an action can be maintained to recover
the cost of AD compliance.
Advertising by the seller or manufacturer should be scruti-
nized to see if any statement rises to the level of an express
warranty. In the Arizona case of Downs v. Shouse ,3 ° for exam-
ple, an aircraft seller claimed that the oil in the engine had
been changed every 50 hours." After the buyer purchased
the aircraft, a renter pilot was required to make a forced
landing as a result of a sudden oil pressure loss.3 2 A subse-
quent examination of the engine revealed that the oil pres-
sure had dropped because an oil filter adapter plate was
loose. The buyer of the damaged aircraft brought an action
against the seller on a theory of breach of express and implied
Id. at 231-32.
27 Id. at 233.
- See U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (1972). Section 2-313(2) provides, "[I]t is not necessary to
the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as "warrant"
or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty .... " Id.
U.C.C. §§ 2-313(l)(a), (b) (1972).
18 Ariz. App. 225, 501 P.2d 401 (1972).
501 P.2d at 403.
Id Pursuant to a lease arrangement, the purchaser leased the aircraft to a flying
club. A club member was flying the aircraft when the engine lost oil pressure. Id. at
404.
1983]
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warranties. The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the im-
plied warranty theory, since the seller was not an aircraft
merchant,33 but upheld the claim for breach of an express
warranty, holding that the seller's statement concerning regu-
lar 50-hour oil changes constituted an express warranty that
the oil changes had been done correctly.3 4 Since the loose oil
filter adapter plate was the result of a faulty oil change, the
court permitted recovery. 5
A potentially important source of express warranties was
recently recognized by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Limzed Flying Club, Inc. v. Wood.36 In this case the
court held that express warranties were created by the air-
craft's airworthiness certificate and the engine and airframe
logbooks, which the purchaser examined and relied upon in
purchasing the aircraft. 37 The court found that a breach of
those express warranties had occurred, but remanded the case
to the district court for consideration of the question of dam-
ages.3 Since all aircraft are required to have airworthiness
certificates and engine and airframe logs,39 the holding in
Limited Flying Club creates the possibility of liability for sellers
for virtually any defect existing at the time of sale. Perhaps
the only way for a seller to exclude express warranties in light
of the LimitedFlying Club decision will be to require a buyer to
sign a statement that no express warranties have been made
in connection with the sale.4° In the meantime, aircraft own-
ers faced with AD compliance, as well as other disappointed
:... Id. U.C.C. §§ 2-314 and 2-315 require that the seller be a merchant or that the
buyer be relying on the seller to select suitable goods before an implied warranty may
arise.
34 Downs, 501 P.2d at 404.
:15 Id. But see Del Ray Air v. Expressway Airparts, Inc., 468 F.2d 187, 187-88 (10th
Cir. 1972) (holding that statement that "everything about the aircraft was to be in
good working order" did not constitute an express warranty).
: 632 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1980).
7 1d. at 53, 55-56.
, Id. at 57.
Airworthiness certificates are required by 49 U.S.C. § 1423(c) (1976). Log books
are required by 14 C.F.R. §§ 43.9-43.12 (1983).
4 See Seeley, Goodbye Homebuil, Hello, Your Honor, AVIATION CONSUMER, August 11,
1982 at 17 for an example of such a waiver.
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buyers, may attempt to recover from sellers on the basis of
"airworthiness and logbook warranties."
Similar to an action on an express warranty is a claim
against an aircraft seller for fraud and deceit. Such an action
is based on the same types of statements as an express war-
ranty claim: affirmations of fact concerning a particular air-
craft. A recovery for fraud and deceit, however, requires that
the buyer also prove intent to mislead on the part of the
seller, materiality of the misrepresented fact, and justified re-
liance on the part of the buyer which results in injury.4 Be-
cause of the requirement that the buyer prove these extra
elements, a recovery against a seller for fraud and deceit is
usually difficult.42 In Aerospesca Ltd v. But/er Aviation Intema-
tional, Inc. ,43 a Maryland case, the plaintiff hired the defend-
ant to repair some of the plaintiff's aircraft. The defendant's
inspector represented to the plaintiff that the aircraft were
airworthy when in fact they were not.44 The court awarded
the plaintiff actual damages for fraud and deceit, though it
refused to award punitive damages. 45 There is no reported
case where a court has awarded the cost of AD compliance
based on a theory of fraud and deceit.
In the event that a buyer faced with AD compliance can-
not find any applicable express warranty or fraud (or, as an
alternative argument), a claim can be brought for breach of
an implied warranty. The mere fact that an express war-
ranty has been given will not constitute a disclaimer of im-
plied warranties that otherwise may be present.46 Implied
,, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-530 (1977). Under certain circum-
stances, including sales of products to consumers, a person in the business of selling
products may be liable for misrepresentation even though the misrepresentation was
not fraudulently or even negligently made. Id at § 402B.
42 See, e.g., Limited Flying Club v. Wood, 632 F.2d 51, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1980) (revers-
ing plaintiffs' judgment for fraud against an aircraft seller for failure to prove intent to
deceive).
4 , 44 Md. App. 610, 411 A.2d 1055 (1980).
44 Aerospesca, 411 A.2d at 1058, 1063.
41 Id at 1064-65. For a discussion of the possiblity of bringing an action against an
aircraft seller based on deceptive trade practice acts, see Maynard, The Applcaton of
Consumer Protection Legislation to Aviation Litigation, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 621, 626 (1980).
- Empire Airlines v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1948 U.S. Av. R. 457, 461 (D. Kan.)
(stating that if an implied warranty does not relate to matters covered by an express
1983]
10 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
warranties are warranties created not by the words or actions
of the seller, but rather by the law regulating the relationship
between buyer and seller. An implied warranty may arise
under two theories. First, section 2-314 of the U.C.C. creates
an implied warranty of "merchantability"47 when the seller
of an aircraft is an aircraft merchant; that is, one who deals in
aircraft and holds himself out as having knowledge and skill
in dealing in aircraft.4" While the term "merchantability"
can mean a number of different things in a number of differ-
ent contexts,49 in an aircraft sale it will generally mean that
the aircraft is fit for the ordinary purposes to which such an
aircraft is put.50 Arguably, an aircraft grounded until an AD
is complied with is not fit for any ordinary aircraft purpose
and hence is not merchantable.
The second warranty created by operation of law is the im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.5" This im-
plied warranty arises when the seller knows the particular
purpose for which the aircraft is being purchased and knows
that the buyer is relying on the skill or judgment of the seller
to select a suitable aircraft.5 2 In such circumstances, the air-
craft seller impliedly warrants that the aircraft is fit for the
particular purpose for which the buyer has purchased it.53
This implied warranty does not require that a seller be a
merchant. The key to recovery under this implied warranty
theory is reliance by the buyer on the seller's judgment, and
warranty, both may exist); Patron Aviation, Inc. v. Teledyne, 154 Ga. App. 13, 267
S.E.2d 274, 277 (1980) (holding that a limited express warranty by an aircraft engine
manufacturer does not constitute waiver of an implied warranty by the engine seller).
47 U.C.C. § 2-314(l) (1972).
:" U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1972).
9 Merchantability means that the goods must be unobjectionable in the trade
under the contract description; be of fair, average quality in the case of fungible goods;
be fit for the ordinary purposes of use; be of even kind, quality and quantity within a
unit; be adequately contained, packaged and labelled; and conform to any promises or
statements made on the container or label. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a)-(f) (1972).
- U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1972). The use to which an aircraft can be put is regulated
by its airworthiness certificate and classification at the time of transfer. The certifica-
tion standards for various categories of aircraft are set forth in 14 C.F.R. §§ 23-35
(1983).
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1972).
SId.
Id.
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knowledge of such reliance on the part of the seller.54 Estab-
lishing such reliance and knowledge can present interesting
proof problems. In Empire Airlines v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,5" for
example, aircraft delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff
failed to operate properly in the cold climate of upstate New
York. The plaintiff sued for breach of implied warranty.56
The District Court for the District of Kansas, in considering
whether to find an implied warranty of fitness for the particu-
lar purpose of reliable cold-weather operation, reasoned that
if the aircraft had been manufacturered especially for the
plaintiff to use in upstate New York, such a warranty
existed.57
In the event that an AD is issued concerning a defect in an
aircraft that the buyer can prove was present when he
purchased the aircraft from the seller, recovery may be possi-
ble under one or both of these implied warranties. Unfortu-
nately, implied warranties can be modified or completely
excluded by appropriate language in the contract of sale.58
While section 2-316 of the U.C.C. requires specific language
and conspicuousness to effectively disclaim implied warran-
ties 59 any seller of aircraft large enough to be considered a
merchant, or with enough aircraft on hand to be able to im-
ply a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, probably is
sophisticated enough to know how to effectively limit or ex-
clude any implied warranties.6 °
Thwarted by the absence of express warranties and an ef-
fective exclusion or limitation of implied warranties, the dis-
tressed aircraft purchaser might reasonably wonder if the
growing body of federal law regarding warranties might af-
ford some finanacial relief from the cost of an AD. While
there is a possibility that federal law might apply, in general
it will afford an aircraft owner no relief. Federal warranty
I d.
1948 U.S. Av. R. 457 (D. Kan.).
r" Id. at 458-60.
5,7 Id. at 462.
m U.C.C. § 2-316.
U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
, See Magdelinat, supra note 19, at 164.
19831
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law centers around the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act (Magnuson-Moss).6
This act limits the right of a manufacturer to disclaim or
limit warranty protection. 62 Magnuson-Moss, however, ap-
plies only to "consumer products. ' 63 A consumer product is
defined as "tangible personal property which is distributed in
commerce and which is normally used for personal, family or
household purposes. '64 A private aircraft might be a con-
sumer product if it is to be used for personal or family use.
65
There is legislative history suggesting that even a small
amount of consumer use is sufficient to bring an entire line of
products within the consumer product definition.66 If a court
could be convinced to so hold, Magnuson-Moss could be a
useful tool for some aircraft owners. In a Georgia case con-
struing the term "consumer product" in the context of an air-
craft engine, however, the court did not look to the entire
range of uses to which the aircraft's engine might be or was
15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976).
A full discussion of Magnuson-Moss is beyond the scope of this article. In brief,
Magnuson-Moss differentiates between "full" and "limited" warranties. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2303 (1976). Minimum standards must be met before a warranty may be considered
full. Id. § 2304. Limited warranties, on the other hand, are subject to considerably
fewer requirements, but such warranties must be labelled as "limited" and there are
certain requirements concerning circumstances under which a manufacturer can dis-
claim a warranty. Id. § 2308. An attack on a disclaimer on grounds of violation of
Magnuson-Moss was attempted in Patron Aviation, Inc. v. Teledyne Ind., Inc. 154 Ga.
App. 13, 13, 267 S.E.2d 274, 278 (1980),dtcussedtinfta in text accompanying notes 66-
69.
.... See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302-2305, 2308 (1976). See also L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.05[2] (1981).
,, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(l) (1976).
Balser v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 512 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (stating
that regardless of its cost, an aircraft could be held to be a "consumer good" so long as
it is used or bought for use for primarily personal, family, or household purposes). See
also S. REP. No. 93-151, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1973). The Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the agency empowered to enforce Magnuson-Moss, has, however, decided that
aircraft are not consumer products within the meaning of Magnuson-Moss. 41 Fed.
Reg. 26,757 (1976) (amending 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721 (1975)).
- Maynard, supra note 45, at 631; H. R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprttedth 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702, 7717. The number of aircraft
purchased for personal use is quite small. The General Aviation Manufacturers Asso-
ciation estimates that only about four percent of new general aviation aircraft are
purchased for personal use, the rest being purchased for business. Lacagnina, supra
note 13.
AIR WORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
put, but looked rather to the use that such engines are nor-
mally put.67 In Patron Aviation, Inc. v. Teledyne Industries, Inc. ,68
the Georgia Court of Appeals found that warranties on an
aircraft engine were not covered by Magnuson-Moss because
aircraft engines are not normally used for personal or family
use.69 There was no consideration of whether the particular
aircraft or engine was generally used for personal or family
use. 70
Recovery under Magnuson-Moss is unlikely for anyone
other than an individual who buys an aircraft solely for per-
sonal use. If a distressed aircraft buyer can, however, con-
vince the court that a significant number of the type of
aircraft he owns are used for personal use, there is a chance
that Magnuson-Moss can be used to attack the disclaimers,
exclusions and limitations that are a part of manufacturers'
warranties. Such an allegation should probably be part of
any aircraft owner's attempt to force a manufacturer or sup-
plier to pay for the cost of AD compliance.71
In summary, then, an aircraft owner facing an AD should
first consult the warranty furnished by the manufacturer or
seller, or the warranties of any other suppliers that may have
furnished components that are involved in AD compliance.
If any of those warranties are in effect and cover the defect
that is the subject of the AD, the owner should follow the
warranty claim procedures set forth in the warranty. If the
warranty has expired or the defect is excluded from coverage,
the owner should consider his immediate seller as the source
of additional warranties. In light of the holding in Limited
- Patron Aviation, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 154 Ga. App. 13, 267 S.E.2d 274,
278 (1980).
'I Id.
,I d. at 278. The court stated that "it would stretch the greatest of imaginations to
hold that an aircraft engine is normally used for personal, family or household pur-
poses." Id.
7 Id In fact, the aircraft was used by an aviation business. Id at 276. The preva-
lence of leasebacks in the sale of new aircraft may account for the relative lack of
reported cases of aircraft warranty exclusions and limitations being attacked under
Magnuson-Moss.
71 An individual should reflect on the tax consequences of claiming that an aircraft
is being owned for personal use before making such a claim in attempting to attack a
warranty limitation or exclusion by using Magnuson-Moss.
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Flying Club, a claim of an express warranty based on the air-
craft's airworthiness certificate should be plead.7" If state-
ments of the seller were untrue and the buyer suspects that
the seller knowingly sold a defective aircraft, an action for
fraud and deceit should also be considered. Any contract of
sale and the facts surrounding it should be scrutinized to see
if any warranties can be implied and whether there have
been effective disclaimers or limitations. If all of these ave-
nues still produce no warranty, disclaimers should also be ex-
amined in light of Magnuson-Moss, if that act is applicable.
B. Neghgence
If an aircraft owner cannot recover the cost of an AD in a
claim for breach of warranty, there exists the possibility of a
claim against a manufacturer, component supplier or seller
for negligence. Negligence is generally the breach of a duty
that one person owes to another that results in an injury.73 In
the context of aircraft design, manufacture, marketifg and
servicing, the possibilities for negligence are virtually limit-
less. In order to prevail on a claim of negligence, the plaintiff
must first establish that the defendant owed a duty to the
plaintiff.74 The duty to conform to a particular standard of
conduct may be established in a number of different ways,
such as by a statute or regulation or by a judicially-created
duty to act reasonably.75 In aviation cases, plaintiffs have fre-
quently attempted to establish that the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 and regulations promulgated thereunder creates such
a duty. In Rauch v. United Instruments ,76 for example, the plain-
tiffs unsuccessfully based their action to recover for the cost of
compliance with an AD, inter a/ia, on a theory of negligence
for breach of the sections of the Act dealing with aircraft ap-
pliances.7 7 In the Georgia case of Tanner v. Rebel Avi'ation,
72 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
7:1 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
71 Id.
W. PROSSER, supra note 73, § 53.
,1 548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976).
77 Id. at 454. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97. See also Delta Air Lines v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 243-44 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating in dicta that
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Inc. ,78 the plaintiffs claimed that the former owner of a 1955
Aero Commander was negligent in failing to maintain, repair
or inspect the aircraft with the result that it did not meet
FAA airworthiness standards at the time the plaintiff
purchased it.79 The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the
plaintiff's theory, holding that the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions were not commercial warranties and denied the plaintiff
any recovery. 0
Other plaintiffs, with varying degrees of success, have re-
lied upon duties imposed by law to establish negligence."'
One such common law duty is the duty to act reasonably so
as to protect others from unreasonable risk of harm. 2 In de-
termining whether a person has acted reasonably, the courts
generally balance the risk associated with a particular activ-
ity or course of conduct against the social utility or benefits to
be gained by that activity.a3 Alternative methods of accom-
plishing the same goal and the costs associated with those al-
ternative methods are other factors often considered in
determining reasonableness.8 ' Failure to notify users of poten-
tial problems with propellers was held to be negligence by the
violation of a Federal Aviation Regulation is evidence of negligence). But see Bruce v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446-47 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that defendants
raised a successful defense in a negligence action where they proved compliance with
all applicable federal safety standards at the time of manufacture).
7 146 Ga. App. 110, 245 S.E.2d 463 (1978).
71 Tanner, 245 S.E.2d at 464-69.
-o Id. at 465.
1' See, e.g., La Belle v. McCauley Indus. Corp., 649 F.2d 46, 48-50 (1st Cir. 1981),
discussedthfra in text accompanying note 86; Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d
1089, 1096 (5th Cir. 1973), diussed infra in text accompanying note 87; Braniff Air-
ways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959
(1969), modifed on other grounds, 424 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970)
(holding that after dangerous defects in the design of an aircraft engine have come to
the manufacturer's attention, the manufacturer has a duty to either remedy the defects
or give users adequate warning); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 236-37
(3d Cir. 1964), discussed itfa in text accompanying note 85; Boeing Airplane Co. v.
Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding that an aircraft manufacturer has a
duty to exercise reasonable care in the design and construction of an aircraft compo-
nent as well as in the testing and inspecting of a particular component which is in-
stalled in its manufactured product).
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Noel v. Uniied Air-
craft Corp. 85 and by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in LaBelle v. McCauley Industries Corp. 86 In Kr/ser v. Beech Air-
craft Corp. 87 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that failure to advise pilots of fuel unporting problems was
negligence. In other cases failure to adequately inspect and
test components supplied by other manufacturers before in-
corporating them into the finished product has also given rise
to negligence liability."'
An aircraft owner seeking to recover the cost of AD compli-
ance on a negligence theory must also contend with two more
obstacles to recovery. First, some courts are reluctant to allow
a recovery for negligence for a strictly "commercial" loss
where there is no property damage or personal injury.8 9 Sec-
ond, the same disclaimers, exclusions and limitations that
hamper a recovery for breach of warranty' also are used as a
defense to negligence claims.9' If the jurisdicition is reluctant
342 F.2d 232, 236-37 (3d Cir. 1964).
649 F.2d 46, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1981).
479 F.2d 1089, 1096 (5th Cir. 1973).
Pan American World Airways v. United Aircraft Corp., 53 Del. 7, 163 A,2d 582,
587 (1960). Some courts have adopted a rule making a manufacturer fully liable for
any defective part in the finished product. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291
F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir. 1961); King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108, 110 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (holding aircraft manufacturer liable for deaths caused by defec-
tive aircraft on a strict liability theory).
See, e.g., Tanner, 245 S.E.2d at 465-66 (holding that failure to maintain an aircraft
does not create a cause of action for negligence where only commercial loss is in-
volved); Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d
284, 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). See also Note, Omni F/yvig Club v. Cessna Aircrafl Corp., 41
J. AIR L. & COM. 524, 534 (1975).
See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., V.A.R.I.G. Airlines v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that an exculpatory clause whereby an aircraft purchaser agreed to waive any
obligation "arising from tort" was valid under California law); Delta Air Lines v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 243-44 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding aircraft man-
ufacturer's exculpatory clause valid); Delta Air Lines v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal.
App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 (1965) (holding aircraft manufacturer's exculpatory
clause valid). Not only must plaintiffs contend with these specialized defenses, but they
may also face "routine" negligence defenses such as contributory negligence and as-
sumption of the risk. In Washington Jet, Inc. v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 442
(N.D. Ill. 1981), the defendant contended that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of the
cost of later AD compliance when it bought an aircraft already subject to an AD, and
where a later AD and the earlier AD covered the same problems with the aircraft. Id.
at 444. The court rejected the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ques-
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to recognize recovery for purely commercial losses on a negli-
gence theory in most situations, it might be worthwhile to
contend that recovery for the cost of compliance with ADs
should be an exception since ADs are safety related. 92 Since
one of the objects of the law of negligence is to safeguard per-
sons from injuries or losses, it could be argued that permitting
recovery for the cost of AD compliance should be allowed in
order to encourage aircraft manufacturers to design and
build safe aircraft in the first place.93 An attempt to assert
such a safety-related negligence theory of recovery for com-
mercial losses resulting from an AD was rejected, however, in
Rauch."4 In Rauch, the plaintiffs brought a class action
against an altimeter manufacturer for the cost of modifying
or replacing altimeters to comply with an AD.95 One of the
theories of recovery was negligence, with the plaintiffs assert-
ing that since ADs were accident prevention measures, they
should be allowed to recover for the negligence of the manu-
facturer that led to the AD even before any accident had oc-
curred.96 The court, however, rejected tie plaintiffs' theory
and held that ADs were not a part of a scheme to protect
aircraft owners from economic losses and created no right of
recovery from the manufacturer for negligence. 97
If an aircraft owner is fortunate enough to be able to bring
tion but left open the possibility that the defendant might prevail at trial if it could
prove the elements of the assumption of risk. Id. at 466-67.
See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
Such a theory was suggested by the California Supreme Court in Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (1965). The court
drew -a distinction between the law of commercial warranties, which allocated the risk
that a particular product would not perform as expected, and the law of products
liability, which sought to prevent the sale of unsafe products. In Trans World Airlines
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., I Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955),
the plaintiffs pressed a similar argument on the court, contending that the extreme
danger associated with catastrophic engine and propeller failure in aircraft justified
imposing "commercial loss" liability on manufacturers to prod them to design and
produce more reliable engines and propellers. The New York Supreme Court, how-
ever, rejected the plaintiffs' theory and limited the plaintiffs' recovery for repair of the
defective engines and propellers to losses occurring from breach of warranty. Trans
World Ai'rhnes, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976).
9, Id at 454.
- Id at 458.
- Id. at 458-59.
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an action in a jurisdiction that does recognize a claim for neg-
ligence that results in only economic loss,98 or if the owner
can convince a court to make an exception for AD-related
conduct in spite of the adverse holding in Rauch, there may
remain the problem of contractual exclusions and express
limitations of liability for negligence. 99 Such provisions are
common in aircraft sales contracts. There are two avenues by
which to attack such exclusions and limitations: (1) read
narrowly, they are inapplicable to the negligence for which
relief is sought; and (2) they are against the public policy of
the jurisdiction whose law applies. These two forms of attack
have met with varying degrees of success.
It is well-established that contractual exclusions and limi-
tations on recovery for negligence are read narrowly by the
courtso The application of this rule gives the aircraft owner
a chance to contend that, read narrowly, an exclusion or limi-
tation does not apply to a particular AD. In Keystone Aeronau-
tics Corp. v. R.j. Enstrom Corp. ,'0o the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that a disclaimer of "any liability in con-
nection with the sale was not specific enough to disclaim lia-
bility for negligence as a matter of law" and that a trial
would be required on the question of the extent of the dis-
claimer. 1 2 Similarly, in O'Brien v. Grumman Corp. ,'o3 the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York refused to
dismiss the plaintiff's negligence claim solely on the basis of
- See, e.g., Tanner, 245 S.E.2d at 465, dticussedsupra at notes 78-80 and accompanying
text. See also Omni Flying Club Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 366 Mass. 154, 315 N.E.2d
855, 887-88 (1974) (holding that a negligence cause of action exists for the negligent
manufacture and sale of an aircraft); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Sup-
ply Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873, 878-81 (1958) (stating that an action for
breach of an implied warranty is tantamount to suing for negligence). See general/(
Comment, supra note 22, 540-41.
See Magdelinat, supra note 19, at 164.
Steiner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 714 (10th Cir. 1974);
O'Brien v. Grumman Corp., 475 F. Supp. 284, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Lockheed Air-
craft Serv.- Int'l, Inc. v. Seaboard & Western Airlines, 1959 U.S. Av. Rep. 351, 353
(S.D.N.Y.); Ozark Air Lines v. Fairchild-Hiller Corp., 71 111. App. 3d 637, 390 N.E.2d
444, 447 (1979); Pan American World Airways v. United Aircraft Corp., 55 Del. 7, 163
A.2d 582, 587 (1960).
- 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974).
,02 Id. at 150.
-, 475 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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exclusionary language, where the language failed to reveal
"the 'unmistakable intent' of the parties to relieve Grumman
American of liability for its own negligence." ' 4 The court
seemed impressed by the fact that certain sections of the con-
tract expressly mentioned negligence but that the exclusion-
ary clause did not.1"5  Even though narrowly read,
exculpatory clauses or disclaimers of liability for negligence
are sometimes upheld.10 6 Courts are particularly apt to up-
hold such clauses and disclaimers in instances where a trans-
action involves knowledgeable parties on both sides and
where the disclaimers and exclusions are part of the bar-
gained-for-exchange of a contract."0 7
If the exclusions and limitations are held to be applicable
to the complained-of defect, the final avenue of attack for an
aircraft owner seeking recovery for compliance with an AD is
to assert that such exclusions and limitations are void as
against public policy. While there is authority holding that
such disclaimers are void,' they generally have been upheld
' Id at 290.
"" Id See also Steiner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 713-14 (10th
Cir. 1974) (language found to be an effective warranty disclaimer held not explicit
enough to bar claim for negligence); Pan American World Airways v. United Aircraft
Corp., 55 Del. 7, 163 A.2d 582, 586-87 (1960) (warranty exculpatory clause held inef-
fective to disclaim liability for negligence).
" See, e.g., Airlift Int'l Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267, 269 (9th
Cir. 1982) (holding that an aircraft purchase agreement exculpation clause was not
vitiated under state law by aircraft manufacturer's alleged violation of federal air regu-
lations); Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 677 F.2d 771, 773
(9th Cir. 1982) (holding parties bound to exculpatory agreement contained in war-
ranty provision); V.A.R.I.G. Airlines v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746, 753-54 (9th Cir.
1981); Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936, 940 (2d
Cir. 1980) (holding disclaimer clause to be broad enough to include post-delivery negli-
gence); Delta Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 243-44 (5th Cir.
1974); Delta Air Lines v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518,
522-24 (1965).
,'l See Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936, 940
(2d Cir. 1980); Delta Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas, 503 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir.
1974).
- Courts have held various agreements contracting away a right to sue for negli-
gence void as against public policy. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of California,
60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 442-47, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 35-39 (1963) (holding hospital
negligence release form void as against public policy); Meiman v. Rehabilitation
Center, Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that exculpatory contract
between plaintiff and rehabilitation center for center's negligence was invalid as being
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where the only loss complained of is economic.09
A claim for negligence asserted by an aircraft owner seek-
ing to recover the cost of compliance with an AD faces a
number of hurdles. The plaintiff must show that the defend-
ant had a duty to the plaintiff to design and produce safe
aircraft and that the condition that was the subject of the AD
was caused by the defendant's failure to meet that duty."1
Many courts do not recognize an action for negligence for a
purely commercial loss,"' though a plaintiff might conceiva-
bly convince a court to recognize one for the cost of AD com-
pliance on the ground that ADs are safety-related."1 2 Even if
a jurisdiction recognizes a claim for negligence for economic
loss, the contractual disclaimers of the seller may bar it, and
sufficientiy explicit disclaimers will probably be upheld by
the courts.' 1 3
C. Strict Products Liabito
Another potential avenue of recovery for an aircraft owner
seeking to force a manufacturer to pay the cost of AD compli-
ance is an action based on strict products liability. Such a
claim can be asserted as a third count in an action also alleg-
ing breach of warranty and negligence. 1 4 A recovery for
against public policy); Gray v. Galesburg, 71 Mich. App. 161, 247 N.W.2d 338, 341
(1976) (holding that release executed by police prisoner while still in custody that pur-
ported to relieve police officers from civil liabilities for his arrest was void and unen-
forceable as against public policy); See also U.C.C. § 2-318, which prevents a
manufacturer from disclaiming liability for breach of warranty resulting in personal
injury.
"'l Delta Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1974)
(disclaimer of liability for negligence held not to be a violation of California public
policy); Keystone Aeronatuics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp., 364 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D.
Penn. 1973), reu'don othergrounds, 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974). (disclaimer of liability
for negligence held not to be a violation of Pennsylvania public policy); Lockheed
Aircraft Serv.-Int'l, Inc. v. Seaboard & Western Airlines, 1959 U.S. Av. Rep. 351, 355
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (disclaimer of liability for negligence held not to beper se violation of
New York public policy); Delta Air Lines v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d
95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 (1965) (negligence liability disclaimer held not in violation
of California public policy).
See supra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 89.
See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
, Plaintiffs asserted claims under all three theories in Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. McDon-
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strict products liability ordinarily requires the following ele-
ments: (1) the person against whom recovery is sought must
be in the business of selling the product that was the source
of the problem; (2) the product sold must be defective; (3) the
product must be unreasonably dangerous to users or consum-
ers in its defective condition; (4) the product must reach the
user or consumer without substantial change from the condi-
tion in which it was sold; and (5) physical injury must result
from the defect.) 5 Noteable is that the plaintiff need not
prove: (1) any failure of the seller to exercise due care in pre-
paring and selling the product; and (2) any contractual rela-
tion between the plaintiff and the seller against whom
recovery is sought." 6 While it is generally true that establish-
ing the elements of strict products liability is easier than es-
tablishing the elements of negligence, failure to establish all
of the elements of strict liability will bar recovery.'
In the case of an AD, especially a serious AD, an aircraft
owner will probably have relatively little difficulty in estab-
lishing the first four elements of recovery for strict products
liability. ADs are, after all, safety related, and are not issued
unless there is a product defect that is a threat to safety.'
The problem is recovery in the absence of the last element:
physical injury. Most courts do not recognize a cause of ac-
tion for strict products liability in the absence of some acci-
dent causing personal injury or at least property damage." 9
nell Doulgas Corp., 685 F.2d 267, 269-70 (9th Cir. 1982); Scandinavian Airlines Sys-
tem v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1979);Rauch, 548 F.2d at 454;
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 240 (5th Cir. 1974);
O'Brten, 475 F. Supp. at 286; Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal.
App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 (1965).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Id
Failure to establish a defective product was held to bar recovery in Bruce v. Mar-
tin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446-47 (10th Cir. 1976), and in Hubschman v. Antil-
les Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828, 846-47 (D.V.I. 1977).
" See supra text accompanying notes 5-10.
See, e.g., Scandinavian Airlines System v. United Aircraft Corp. 601 F.2d 425,
428-29 (9th Cir. 1982); Seely v. White Motor Co. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17, 22 (1965). See generally Note, supra note 89 at 526. Comment, supra note
22 at 540-51. In addition, an aircraft manufacturer may raise a defense of assumption
of the risk. See supra note 91.
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In the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case of Scandina-
vian Airines System v. Uni'ted Aircraft Corp. ,12o for example, the
plaintiff brought an action based on strict products liability
when engine fan blades failed in engines purchased by the
plaintiff from the defendant.12' No injuries resulted from
these failures but the DC-9 aircraft on which the engines
were installed was damaged. 22 In considering the applicabil-
ity of strict products liability, the court found that the basis of
the doctrine was risk distribution between manufacturers and
consumers and the protection of small consumers who could
not bargain effectively with large manufacturers. 123  In this
case, however, the plaintiff and defendant negotiated the
purchase of the jet engines as economic and technically ex-
pert equals and were able to allocate the risk of economic loss
as part of the bargained-for-exchange. 24 The Ninth Circuit
therefore rejected the plaintiffs attempt to recover economic
losses on a theory of strict products liability. 25
Even in jurisdictions that recognize a cause of action in
strict products liability for economic lOSS, 12 6 an aircraft own-
er seeking to recover the cost of AD compliance will likely
still face the nemesis of a disclaimer, exclusion or limitation of
liability. 27 These disclaimers, exclusions and limitations will
be read narrowly by the courts, and sometimes will be held
inapplicable for lack of explicitness. 28 They can also be at-
tacked on public policy grounds. 29 Most likely, however,
601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979).
'' Id. at 427.
a Id at 426-27.
Id at 428.
' Id
2. Id at 429.
126 See, e.g., Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 310-11
(1965) (stating that a manufacturer of products is strictly liable in tort to an ultimate
consumer for injuries or damages resulting from defective products, even where the
only damage is to the article sold); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d
145, 153, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 25 (1965) (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting); see also
Comment, supra note 22, at 540-541.
, See Magdelinat, supra note 19 at 166.
Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149-50 (3d
Cir. 1974); Steiner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 712 (10th Cir.
1974).
'19 See Delta Air Lines v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr.
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they will be upheld where the only loss is the cost of comply-
ing with an AD. 30 An attempt to recover the cost of an AD
on a theory of strict liability is not, therefore, likely to be
successful.
D. Action Under Federal Aviation Act of 1958
As the preceding sections have shown, the aircraft owner
attempting to recover the cost of AD compliance from a man-
ufacturer faces an uphill struggle. If the AD item is still
under warranty, recovery may be fairly simple, but attempt-
ing to recover under implied warranties, negligence or strict
products liability means contending with elaborate disclaim-
ers as well as with courts that probably do not even recognize
the theory of recovery asserted. Because of these difficulties,
some aircraft owners have attempted to recover the cost of
AD compliance on a theory that the Federal Aviation Act of
1958"3' (Act) creates a private cause of action for its breach
and a condition causing the promulgation of an AD is a
breach of the Act. 32 In effect, this theory eliminates one step
from the theory that violation of the Act constitutes negli-
gence: the plaintiff need not show that the violation of the
Act breaches a duty of due care. 133 While the theory of such
an action is ingenious, there has been little acceptance of it by
the courts. 134  There is no express creation of a private cause
of action for most sections of the Act. 35 Persons seeking re-
covery under the Act have therefore had to rely on the theory
of an implied cause of action.
518, 519-23 (1965) (trial court holding exclusion void as against public policy
reversed).
- See, e.g., Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267, 269 (9th
Cir. 1982); V.A.R.I.G. Airlines v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1981);
Tokio Marine & Fire Ins., 617 F.2d 936, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1980); Scandinavian Airlines
System v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 428-29 (9th Cir. 1982); Delta Air Lines
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 1974); O'Brien v. Grumman
Corp., 475 F. Supp. 284, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
.... 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1523 (1976).
.... See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421(a)(1)-(4), 1423, 1430(a)(1) (1976).
1:1:1 See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
.... See infra notes 141-175 and accompanying text. Certain sections of the Act do
create a private cause of action. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a), 1487(a) (1976).
,:m But see 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a), 1487(a) (1976).
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Under certain circumstances, courts have held that the Act
does imply a private cause of action. In In Re Paris Air Crash of
March 3, 197,136 the District Court for the Central District of
California held that the Act creates a private cause of action
for persons injured or killed in aircraft crashes. 137 The court
applied Cori v. Ash 'IS38 four-factor test for determining
whether an implied cause of action exists. The court found
that a private cause of action could be implied from the
Act 139 because: (1) the Act was for the special protection and
safety benefit of airline passengers; (2) an intent to create a
private cause of action was inferable from the FAA's power to
promulgate safety regulations; (3) a private cause of action
was consistent with a Congressional intent to mandate proper
design and construction of aircraft; and (4) the pervasive reg-
ulation of aviation by the federal government pre-empted
state regulation. 140
More typically, however, courts have refused to find a pri-
vate cause of action to be implied by the Act. In the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals case of Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying
Service, Inc. ,"' a pilot rented an aircraft from the defend-
ant. 42 The aircraft crashed and the surviving passengers
sued the defendant on the theory that the Act made the de-
fendant vicariously liable for the negligence of the pilot. 43
.... 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
137 Id at 748.
,: 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The four factor test set forth by the Supreme Court is: (1)
is the plaintiff one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was passed; (2) are
there indications of legislative intent to create or deny a cause of action; (3) is an im-
plied cause of action consistent with the underlying purposes of the statute; and (4) is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law. Id
,:19 Parts Ai'rcrash, 399 F. Supp. at 748.
'41 Id Prior to Cort, the District Court for the Central District of California reached
a similiar result in Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 613 (C.D. Cal. 1972). Gabel
arose out of a collision between an air carrier and a Marine fighter aircraft. Id at 615.
The court held that persons injured in an aviation accident have a cause of action
tinder the Act against a carrier. Id See also East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, 282 F.
Supp. 507, 513 (D. Conn. 1968) (home owners located near an airport held to have a
private cause of action under Act for repeated low flights of aircraft). See generall Car-
sey, supra note 5, at 304.
14 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
Id at 1390.
* Id.
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The plaintiffs asserted that since the Act defines "operation of
an aircrait" to include authorizing the operation of an air-
craft,'4 4 the defendant had operated an aircraft by renting
the aircraft to the pilot. 14 5 The plaintiffs conceded that the
relevant state law imposed no liability on the defendants.146
In support of their contention that the Act intended to im-
pose vicarious liability on aircraft lessors, the plaintiffs
pointed out that certain sections expressly exempted security
interest holders from liability.'47 They also asserted that it
was sound public policy to impose liability on financially re-
sponsible aircraft owners rather than impecunious renter pi-
lots.' 48 The Fifth Circuit, however, rejected the plaintiffs'
theory, finding that Congress, in passing the Act, had not in-
tended to pre-empt state laws regarding the liability of bail-
ors to third parties. 149 The court reasoned that Congress only
intended to subject aircraft owners to the Act and regulations
promulgated under it and did not intend to create a private
cause of' action under the Act.'5 °
This interpretation of the Act has been almost uniformly
applied. 5 ' For example, in Polansky v. Trans World Airhnes, '52
,4 49 U.S.C. § 1301(31) (Supp. IX 1982), formery codif6ed at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1301(26)(1970).
145 Rogers, 435 F.2d at 1391.
-" Id at 1392.
147 Id
"- Id at 1393.
149 Id
-) Id at 1394. Interpretations of state statutes patterned after the Act on the issue
of owner vicarious liability for renter pilot negligence have almost uniformly found
owners to be vicariously liable. See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines v. United States, 504 F.2d
104, 114 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (interpreting Indiana law);
Harp v. Morgan, 221 F. 2d 481, 482-83 (5th Cir. 1955) (construing Mississippi law);
Ross v. Apple, 143 Ind. App. 357, 240 N.E.2d 825, 829-30 (1968); Lamasters v.
Snodgress, 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622, 624-26 (1957); Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H.
168, 97 A.2d 223, 226 (1953); Heideman v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164, 166-67,
169 (1972) (applying Nebraska law). Contra Broadway v. Webb, 462 F. Supp. 429, 433
(W.D.N.C. 1977) (applying law of North Carolina); Ferrari v. Byerly Aviation, Inc.,
131 Ill. App. 2d 747, 268 N.E.2d 558, 560 (1971). In Haskin v. Northeast Airways,
Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d 81 (1963) the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to
find vicarious owner liability in interpreting a statute similar to the Act. The court
noted, however, that there was another Minnesota statute covering a bailor's liability.
123 N.W.2d at 83. After the decision of the court, the Minnesota legislature changed
the law. See Ewers v. Thunderbird Aviation, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Minn. 1979).
' " See, e.g., Diefenthal v. C.A.B., 681 F.2d 1039, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
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the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Act
did not create a private cause of action for tour passengers
against a tour operator for inferior accommodations arranged
during the tour. 53 Similarly, in Obenshaith v. Haliday,'54 the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia refused to
recognize an implied right of action for an air carrier's viola-
tion of safety regulations.1
5
Only one reported case has considered the narrow question
of whether the Act creates a private right of action for an
aircraft owner seeking recovery of the costs of AD compliance
from a manufacturer. In Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc. ,56 an
action was brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by
three joint-owners of a Cessna aircraft alleging that the air-
craft contained an altimeter manufactured by the defend-
ant.'57 The altimeter was in need of replacement or
modification as a result of an AD. The plaintiffs brought an
action for actual and consequential damages on four theories:
(1) breach of implied warranties of merchantability and of
fitness for a particular purpose; 58  (2) negligence;159 (3) strict
products liability;' 6° and (4) breach by the defendants of the
Act and its regulations.' 6 ' The plaintiffs then sought leave to
no implied cause of action exists under the Act for persons denied seating in no smok-
ing area of aircraft by an air carrier); Lockwood v. Astronautics Flying Club, 437 F.2d
437, 439 (5th Cir. 1971); Rosedail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681, 683-85
(D. Colo. 1969); Nachsin v. De LaBretonne, 17 Cal. App. 3d 637, 95 Cal. Rptr. 227,
228-29 (1971). Contra Sosa v. Young Flying Serv., 277 F. Supp. 554, 556-57 (S.D. Tex.
1967). For a general discussion of the judicial treatment of attempts to imply a private
cause of action under the Federal Aviation Act, see Note, The Decline of the Imphed
Prtoate Cause of Action, Continued: The Third Circuit Construes the Federal Aviation Act, 31
RUTGERS L. REV. 41 (1978).
'52 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975).
-1 Id at 337.
154 504 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Va. 1980).
Id at 949-50.
548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 454.
Id. See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
'" Id See supra notes 73-113 and accompanying text.
Id. See supra notes 114-130 and accompanying text.
Id The plaintiffs alleged a breach of 49 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(7) (1976). This section
provides that it shall be unlawful "[qor any person holding an air agency or produc-
tion certificate to violate" the certificates terms or any "order, rule, or regulation" re-
lating to it. Id.
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amend their complaint to state a claim for $15,000,000 in pu-
nitive damages for the defendant's alleged breach of the sec-
tions of the Act dealing with aircraft appliances. 162 The
defendants opposed the amendment on grounds that the Act
created no private cause of action. 16 3
The district court granted the plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend on the basis of the four factors identified by the
Supreme Court in Cort: (1) the Act had been passed for the
special benefit of members of the public who owned or flew
airplanes, including protection from economic loss; (2) pri-
vate actions were not expressly forbidden and were not in-
compatible with FAA enforcement of the Act; (3) allowing
such private actions would be consistent with the legislative
scheme of enforcement of the Act, since the threat of private
actions is an incentive to comply with the Act; and (4) the
pervasive regulation of aviation by the federal government
indicated a desire that settlements reached under state law
causes of action not compromise aviation safety.' 64 The dis-
trict court therefore held that the Act did create a private
cause of action for aircraft owners to recover the cost of AD
compliance from manufacturers. 65 On rehearing, the court
reaffirmed its decision, citing the fact that ADs were con-
cerned with safety, not economic regulation and that aviation
was primarily a federal concern, with a need for national
uniformity.'66 The district court permitted an interlocutory
appeal on the issue. 167
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed the district court after conducting its own application
of the four factor test of Cor. .168 The court found that the Act
had not been passed for the special benefit of aircraft owners
and pilots, but was rather intended to benefit the general
"6 Rauch, 548 F.2d at 454.
16, Id.
- Rauch v. United Instruments, 405 F. Supp. 435, 439-41 (E.D. Pa 1975).
, Id at 441-42. The court, perhaps inconsistently, also upheld the plaintiff's right
to claim under state law remedies. Id at 442.
Id at 442, 445-46.
Id at 447.
Rauch, 548 F.2d at 456-60.
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public.1 69 The purpose of the Act, stated the Third Circuit,
was not to protect aircraft owners from the economic risks of
aircraft ownership, even where economic losses arose from
safety related defects. 70
The court also rejected the notion that there was a perva-
sive federal regulation of aviation for the benefit of aircraft
owners.' 7 ' To the extent the federal government did perva-
sively regulate aviation, the court held, it was for the benefit
of the general public, and duties were imposed on both air-
craft owners and manufacturers. 7 2 The court also found that
the allocation of economic risks between aircraft owners and
manufacturers was traditionally a matter regulated by state
laws regarding warranties, negligence or strict products liabil-
ity.' 73 The court held that the fact that the defect complained
of was also the subject of AD did not change the underlying
nature of the claim.' 74 The court did not consider the second
and third elements of the four-part Cort test. 75
The result, then, of the only reported case attempting re-
covery for the cost of an AD on a theory of a private cause of
action under the Act, is unfavorable to aircraft owners.
While some courts may be willing to imply a private cause of
action under the Act on a safety rationale, 7 6 courts in general
are reluctant to use the Act to invade the state laws regulat-
ing tort and contract.
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
As the preceding sections have shown, an aircraft owner
facing an AD has limited prospects of recovering the cost of
compliance from the manufacturer. Theories of negligence,
strict products liability, and implied causes of action under
the Act are not well-suited to recovery for economic losses.
,19 Id at 456-57.
170 Id at 458.
,7, Id. at 459.
- Id
- Id.
", Id at 459-60.
"17 Id at 470.
"7 See supra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
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While a warranty is an economic risk allocator, it is fre-
quently limited in coverage or duration, or disclaimed alto-
gether. One possible solution is for aircraft buyers to
negotiate longer warranty periods specifically for ADs. Ques-
tions of coverage under an AD warranty would not be diffi-
cult to determine, since a defect is either the subject of an AD
or it is not.177 This solution would perhaps be ideal, since the
question of warranty coverage for ADs could then become
part of the bargained-for-exchange between aircraft pur-
chaser and seller.
In the event that manufacturers and aircraft sellers do not
offer such extended AD warranties, is a legislative solution
possible? The federal legislation that has been suggested' 78
has the disadvantage of automatically imposing the economic
risk of ADs on the manufacturer, even if the owner is able
and willing to bear it. Some aircraft owners would therefore
be charged for the manufacturer's cost of fixing all ADs even
though the owner is willing to risk undertaking the economic
burden himself. Moreover, if aircraft manufacturers must
budget for the cost of complying with all ADs, the price of
aircraft, already quite high, will likely increase even more.'7 9
It would not be surprising, however, to see legislation requir-
ing manufacturers to bear the cost of ADs passed in the near
future if manufacturers do nothing more to see to it that air-
craft owners have some protection. Manufacturers are, after
all, in a better position to evaluate the possibility of ADs and
estimate their probable cost, since they design, test and build
the aircraft. The inability of aircraft owners to anticipate
ADs may influence legislatures to require manufacturers to
pay for the cost of ADs.
One alternative legislative approach would be to modify
the law in the area of aircraft warranties to warn aircraft pur-
chasers that the warranty will not apply to ADs that are
'" See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. If such warranties become com-
mon, however, it would give manufacturers an incentive to pressure the FAA not to
make a defect the subject of an AD.
.7" See supra note 13.
.71 See Lacagnina, supra note 13.
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promulgated beyond the warranty period. Such a warning
or disclaimer would have to be conspicuous in the purchase
contract. 8 ° In the absence of such a conspicuous warning or
disclaimer, the manufacturer would be liable for the cost of
rectifying defects in design or construction that result in an
AD within a reasonable time. To forestall any legislation in
this area, it would be in the best interest of manufacturers to
offer, as an option, warranty protection to buyers from the
cost of AD compliance.
- The UC.C. requires that disclaimers of implied warranties be conspicuous.
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1972).
